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TRAFFIC JUSTICE: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE
AND EQUITABLE TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT
IN THE AGE OF VISION ZERO
Marco Conner*
“No goal is more ambitious than zero [traffic fatalities], but at the
same time no other goal is acceptable.” 1 – New York City Mayor Bill
de Blasio
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, more than 40,000 people lost their lives in traffic crashes in
the United States,2 marking the third consecutive year of increases in
traffic fatalities.3 Many view increased police traffic enforcement and
more aggressive prosecution as part of the solution to this violent
pandemic,4 in part because driver actions—like speeding, texting, and
driver inattention—contribute to an estimated ninety-four percent of
those traffic crashes.5 At the same time, a recent shift in public
discourse has shined a light on decades of racially disparate policing
and criminal justice practices.6 Horrific high-profile killings of
African-Americans during police traffic stops reveal only the surface
of our troubled race relations and a failed enforcement and criminal
justice system in the United States, where Black7 drivers are far more

2. STAT. DEP’T, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, NSC MOTOR VEHICLE FATALITY
ESTIMATES
1
(2016),
http://www.nsc.org/NewsDocuments/2017/12-monthestimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/KEQ9-QFNE].
3. See id.; Fatality Facts: Yearly Snapshot 2015, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY
SAFETY
(Nov.
2016),
http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/generalstatistics/fatalityfacts/overview-of-fatality-facts [https://perma.cc/S6NN-3NAX].
4. See CITY OF N.Y., VISION ZERO ACTION PLAN 19 (2014) [hereinafter VISION
ZERO ACTION PLAN], http://www.nyc.gov/html/visionzero/pdf/nyc-vision-zero-actionplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLN3-E472].
5. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CRITICAL
REASONS FOR CRASHES INVESTIGATED IN THE NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH
CAUSATION SURVEY 1 (2015), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/View
Publication/812115 [https://perma.cc/SSA6-N2PL].
6. See generally Will Greenberg, Here’s How Badly Police Violence Has
Divided America, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 19, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/
media/2017/03/police-shootings-black-lives-matter-history-timeline
[https://perma.cc/VF8T-2LW5]; Matt Pearce, Activists Come Up With a Plan to End
Police Killings. Here It Is., L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-police-campaign-zero-20150821-story.html
[https://perma.cc/YTX77CQL].
7. This Article uses the terms Black and African-American interchangeably.
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likely than White drivers to be stopped by police,8 even though
contraband is possessed less often by those Black drivers,9 and where
“African-Americans are far more likely than whites and other groups
to be the victims of use of force by the police.”10
In recent years, many cities have renewed their efforts to reduce
traffic fatalities and serious injuries, some setting the bold goal of
eliminating them altogether.11 In New York City (“NYC”) and
elsewhere, this goal, named Vision Zero, has become government
policy, for which police traffic enforcement is considered a vital
component.12 However, given the racial inequities in our criminal
justice system, the disparate stops of Black drivers, and fatal
outcomes of traffic stops, cities and transportation planners must ask
whether they can defend promoting police traffic enforcement and
increased prosecution to achieve their goals of preventing traffic
deaths and injuries. Critically, they must ask whether such measures
work, and whether there are more effective alternatives to current
practices.
This Article examines the role of traffic enforcement, analyzes its
efficacy to deter dangerous driving, and suggests a new framework for
traffic enforcement suited to the goals of Vision Zero. It argues that
the primary goal of Vision Zero-related traffic enforcement must be
to create long-lasting general deterrence of dangerous driving
behavior if cities are to reduce crashes and eliminate traffic fatalities
and serious injuries. Significantly, the Article highlights deterrence
theories and concepts of fairness as central to understanding solutions
to dangerous driving.

8. See Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of
Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/

2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html [https://perma.cc/3JNLQXWP]; see also infra Section III.A.3.
9. LaFraniere & Lehren, supra note 8; see also Robin Shepard Engel & Jennifer
M. Calnon, Examining the Influence of Drivers’ Characteristics During Traffic Stops
with Police: Results from a National Survey, U. OF CINCINNATI ONLINE MASTER SCI.
CRIM. JUST. (2004),
http://cjonline.uc.edu/resources/criminal-justice-research/
examining-the-influence-of-drivers-characteristics-during-traffic-stops-with-policeresults-from-a-national-survey [https://perma.cc/Z5ZK-AG2R].
10. Timothy Williams, Study Supports Suspicion that Police Are More Likely to
Use Force on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/08/us/study-supports-suspicion-that-police-use-of-force-is-more-likely-forblacks.html [https://perma.cc/FDL2-QAER].
11. See Elevating Efforts in Vision Zero Cities Across the U.S. , VISION ZERO
NETWORK, http://visionzeronetwork.org/about/elevating-efforts-in-vision-zero-citiesacross-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/4YQG-TUKA].
12. See, e.g., VISION ZERO: YEAR THREE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
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The enforcement policies advanced in this Article focus on
deterring future dangerous driving, in line with the goal of Vision
Zero. Therefore, retributive justice, that is, punishment imposed
without an extrinsic social purpose, is not discussed. The role of
public prosecutors will only be discussed tangentially, even though
prosecutor’s offices play an important role in enforcing dangerous
driving offenses.
Additionally, physical changes to road
infrastructure, so-called engineering measures, will only occasionally
be discussed, even though such measures are critical to changing
dangerous driving behavior and mitigating human driver error.13
Finally, this Article references several policies and examples from
NYC related to traffic crashes and enforcement. The city serves as a
useful example of the challenges and possible solutions to address the
pandemic of traffic violence in primarily urban and suburban settings.
NYC is home to a variety of road users, representing within one
jurisdiction the majority of different travel forms used throughout the
United States, including driving, walking, bicycling, and public
transportation. And in a curious twist of fate, the city that registered
the country’s first pedestrian fatality in 1899,14 was also the first U.S.
city to adopt the Vision Zero policy in 2014 to address traffic crashes,
with a focus on risks to pedestrians and other vulnerable road users.15
Despite the loss of more than 4500 lives to traffic violence in NYC
since 2001,16 the city has bucked the recent national trend of
increasing traffic fatalities since 2014, with drops in traffic fatalities
over three consecutive years since 2014, likely due to its Vision Zerorelated measures that include re-designing roads, lowering the citywide speed limit, and operating automated speed enforcement
cameras.17 NYC also has a history of racially disparate policing and
13. See discussion infra Section II.A.
14. Christopher Robbins, NYC’s First Car Accident in 1896 Involved a Bicycle ,
GOTHAMIST (May 14, 2012), http://gothamist.com/2012/05/14/nycs_first_car_accident
_in_1896_inv.php [https://perma.cc/Z8M5-VUPT].
15. See VISION ZERO ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 19, 22. “Vulnerable road
user” is “a term applied to those most at risk in traffic . . . . Pedestrians, pedal cyclists,
and motorcyclists are accordingly considered as vulnerable since they benefit from
little or no external protective devices that would absorb energy in a collision. They
constitute with almost no exception the weak party in a road traffic crash.” Aymery
Constant & Emmanuel Lagarde, Protecting Vulnerable Road Users from Injury,
PLOS MED., Mar. 30, 2010, at 1, http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1000228 [https://perma.cc/Y9AJ-JLJA].
16. See Archives of Statistical Summaries, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
https://dmv.ny.gov/about-dmv/archives-statistical-summaries [https://perma.cc/PYJ2KD2L].
17. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, New York Traffic Deaths Dip Again. It’s Not
Enough, Mayor’s Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
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criminal prosecution practices18 and has drastically increased its
police enforcement of certain traffic-related violations,19 offering
insight into the challenges and opportunities of enforcement in
addressing dangerous driving behavior and the U.S. pandemic of
traffic violence.
I. THE U.S. PANDEMIC OF TRAFFIC VIOLENCE
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the man-made
pandemic of traffic violence has swept across the United States,
killing and injuring people of all ages on highways and city streets.
Henry H. Bliss is believed to be the first pedestrian killed in vehicular
traffic in the United States; he died after being struck by a motorist
on Broadway in NYC in 1899.20 In that year, twenty-six people were
killed in traffic nationwide.21 A decade later, in 1910, that number
had increased to nearly 1600, then in 1925 to nearly 21,000, and, in
1972, the highest year on record, to nearly 55,000 people annually.22
On average, approximately 42,000 people died in traffic crashes
nationwide every year between 1950 and 2009, primarily as motor
vehicle occupants in vehicle-on-vehicle collisions or as pedestrians or

2017/01/10/nyregion/new-york-traffic-deaths-vision-zero.html [https://perma.cc/63M59W8S]; see CITY OF N.Y., VISION ZERO YEAR TWO: YEAR END REVIEW 5, 12 (2015),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/visionzero/assets/vz-year-end-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2VQ-Z87X].
18. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(finding NYC’s stop-and-frisk program unconstitutional); see also BESIKI
KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., RACE & PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN
(2014),
http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race-andprosecution-manhattan-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7PJ-NWAX] (summarizing
a report showing racially disparate results throughout the prosecution process); Irene
Chidinma Nwoye, Cycling on the Sidewalk: The New Stop-and-Frisk?, VILLAGE
VOICE (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/cycling-on-the-sidewalkthe-new-stop-and-frisk-6703521 [https://perma.cc/7RQE-AX67].
19. See VISION ZERO: YEAR THREE REPORT, supra note 1, at 39.
20. Robbins, supra note 14.
21. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AN
ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES IN
2008 27 (2010), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811346
[https://perma.cc/FN5B-UKS5].
22. See id. However, adjusted for population growth, the traffic fatality rate
dropped by ninety percent from 18 per 100 million vehicle miles traveled in 1925 to
1.7 per 100 million vehicle miles traveled in 1997. See Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Motor-Vehicle Safety: A 20th Century Public Health Achievement, 48
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 369, 369-70 (1999), http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/PDF/wk/mm4818.pdf [https://perma.cc/SR23-KKCS].
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bicyclists struck by motorists.23 After several years of overall decline,
estimates indicate that traffic deaths increased in 2016 to more than
40,000, marking the second consecutive year of annual increases for
the first time in at least fifteen years,24 with an estimated economic
cost to society of more than $432 billion.25 Although the annual U.S.
traffic fatality rate (the number of fatalities as part of the overall
population) has declined significantly since the 1970s, Americans are
still more likely to die in traffic than from firearms,26 and as recently
as 2010, motor vehicle crashes were either the top- or second-leading
cause of injury-related death for every age group aged one year and
older.27
The context of these deaths tends to differ between dense urban
and non-urban environments. On highways and outside cities, most
traffic fatalities result from collisions between motorists traveling at
high speeds, while within cities, especially in dense urban settings in
cities like NYC, the majority of deaths and injuries occur when
pedestrians are struck by motor vehicles either traveling at high
speeds or when drivers fail to yield to vulnerable road users.28 In
NYC, more than 4500 people have died in traffic crashes since 2001,
at least 49,000 have suffered serious injuries (including loss of limbs,
23. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., HIGHLIGHTS
2009 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES 1 (2010), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/
Public/ViewPublication/811363 [https://perma.cc/4RVN-YDE4].
24. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., EARLY
ESTIMATE OF MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES FOR THE FIRST 9 MONTHS OF
2016 2 (2017), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812358
[https://perma.cc/L7EA-TV6Q]; STAT. DEP’T, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, NSC MOTOR
VEHICLE FATALITY ESTIMATES, [hereinafter NSC FATALITY ESTIMATES],
http://www.nsc.org/NewsDocuments/2017/12-month-estimates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JH9-RUUZ].
25. By one measure, “[t]he estimated cost of motor-vehicle deaths, injuries, and
property damage in 2016 was $432.5 billion, an increase of 12% from 2015. The costs
include wage and productivity losses, medical expenses, administrative expenses,
employer costs, and property damage.” NSC FATALITY ESTIMATES, supra note 24.
By another measure, the cost has been estimated to be more than $800 billion. See
Issues, ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY & AUTO SAFETY, http://saferoads.org/issues
[https://perma.cc/2BDA-9ST9].
26. See Philip Caulfield, Gun Deaths to Surpass Deaths in Traffic Accidents by
2015:
Report, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 19, 2012, 5:37 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/gun-deaths-outpace-traffic-deaths-2015report-article-1.1223721 [https://perma.cc/L8M8-3Q4M] (citing the CDC).
27. 10 Leading Causes of Injury Deaths by Age Group Highlighting
Unintentional Injury Deaths, United States–2010, OFF. OF STAT. & PROGRAMMING,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/injury/
wisqars/pdf/10LCID_Unintentional_Deaths_2010-a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3C3TCDU].
28. See generally Archives of Statistical Summaries, supra note 16.
OF
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traumatic brain injuries, and other life-altering injuries), and more
than 618,000 have suffered less serious injuries—all of this in just one
U.S. city.29 Regardless of the setting, U.S. roads and streets pose a
high risk of death and injury to all road users.30
II. VISION ZERO: A NEW APPROACH TO ADDRESS THE PANDEMIC
Increasingly, policymakers on all levels of government, grassroots
organizations, and crash victims and their families are no longer
viewing the U.S. pandemic of traffic deaths and injuries as inevitable
“accidents,” but instead as preventable crashes constituting a public
health crisis.31 Cities across the United States are adopting Vision
Zero—a policy and strategy with the goal of eliminating all traffic
fatalities and severe injuries, while increasing safe, healthy, and
equitable transportation and mobility modes.32 First implemented in

29. See id.
30. Compared to other countries with comparable transportation infrastructure
and GDP per capita, U.S traffic fatalities are consistently and significantly higher.
The population-based traffic death rate in the United States is over three times
higher than in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden, and over twice as high as
in France and Germany. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STATUS REPORT ON
ROAD SAFETY 2015, 75-256 (2015), http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/
road_safety_status/2015/en [https://perma.cc/CMZ2-2G8Z].
Comparing traffic
fatality rates by vehicle miles traveled, the differences with these countries tend to
shrink but remain significant. See INT’L TRAFFIC SAFETY DATA & ANALYSIS GRP.,
OECD, ROAD SAFETY ANNUAL REPORT 2015 17-18 (2015), http://www.oecdilibrary.org/transport/road-safety-annual-report-2015_irtad-2015-en
[https://perma.cc/GB6W-25ME]. United States residents are more likely to drive
than European residents, a tendency that can be explained by lower retail gasoline
prices in the United States and better and more accessible public transportation in
many European countries. See Ralph Buehler, 9 Reasons the U.S. Ended Up So
Much More Car-Dependent than Europe, CITYLAB (Feb. 4, 2014),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2014/02/9-reasons-us-ended-so-much-morecar-dependent-europe/8226 [https://perma.cc/J6HD-G25K].
31. See Daniel C. Vock, How a Brooklyn Brewmaster Helped Make New York
City Safer for Pedestrians, GOVERNING (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.governing.com/
topics/urban/gov-vision-zero-pedestrian-deaths-brooklyn-brewery.html
[https://perma.cc/VS49-CE6D].
32. Vision Zero strategies differ somewhat between countries and between cities,
states, and federal governments. For example, Sweden does not have a timeframe
within which to achieve zero deaths. See ARNE KARYD, SWEDEN’S VISION ZERO:
THE LEAST MOURNED TRAFFIC CASUALTY (2001), http://www.kawi.se/visionzero.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SB8S-BTRF]. By contrast, NYC has set a timeframe to achieve
zero traffic fatalities and serious injuries by 2024. See David Meyer, Taking Stock of
Vision Zero Three Years In, STREETSBLOG NYC (Feb. 23, 2017),
http://nyc.streetsblog.org/2017/02/23/taking-stock-of-vision-zero-three-years-in
[https://perma.cc/KPD3-NE7Y]; see also VISION ZERO ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at
7. The U.S. Department of Transportation’s “Road to Zero” strategy has a
timeframe of thirty years but only for traffic fatalities, not serious injuries. See U.S.

DOT, National Safety Council Launch Road to Zero Coalition to End Roadway
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Sweden in the 1990s, Vision Zero is now being applied in several U.S.
cities, including Austin, Chicago, Fort Lauderdale, New York City,
Portland (Oregon), San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.33
Each city’s Vision Zero plan sets a year by which traffic deaths and
serious injuries must be eliminated.34 In 2016, the U.S. federal
government announced its own Vision Zero-inspired “Road to Zero”
program, declaring a goal of reaching zero traffic deaths nationwide
within thirty years.35
A. What Is Vision Zero?
Vision Zero differs from past traffic safety efforts that have focused
on achieving moderate year-over-year reductions in injuries and
fatalities and have applied certain measures—often referred to as the
three “E’s:” engineering, which includes road infrastructure designs
and technical changes;36 education, typically driver awareness and
training;37 and enforcement, typically police traffic enforcement.38
Vision Zero adds several critical new elements: first, the program
Fatalities, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter National Safety Council
Launch Road to Zero Coalition], https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-

dot-national-safety-council-launch-road-zero-coalition-end-roadway-fatalities
[https://perma.cc/4KPA-36M3].
33. See National Safety Council Launch Road to Zero Coalition, supra note 32;
Angie Schmitt, 10 Cities Chosen to Help Model Vision Zero Policy in the U.S. ,
STREETSBLOG USA (Jan. 27, 2016), http://usa.streetsblog.org/2016/01/27/10-citieschosen-to-help-model-vision-zero-policy-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/F3D2-ZU7E].
34. See Schmitt, supra note 33. See generally Vision Zero Cities Map, VISION
ZERO
NETWORK,
http://visionzeronetwork.org/resources/vision-zero-cities
[https://perma.cc/5QD7-LE49] (last updated Mar. 2017).
35. National Safety Council Launch Road to Zero Coalition , supra note 32.
36. Engineering measures include expanded pedestrian curb space, protected bike
lanes, speed restrictions, simplified vehicle movements including left-turn restrictions,
traffic signals with leading pedestrian intervals that eliminate turning conflicts
between vulnerable road users and motor vehicles, pedestrian islands, narrower road
lanes, speed bumps, wide sidewalks, mid-block cross-walks, high visibility painted
crosswalks, “daylighting” treatments that remove parking at and near street corners
to ensure that motorists can have a clean line of sight and can see pedestrians as they
are turning, as well as motor vehicle features, including airbags, collision detection
warnings, and more. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, URBAN STREET
DESIGN GUIDE (2013),
http://nacto.org/publication/urban-street-design-guide
[https://perma.cc/CUT6-V24Z]; Transp. Alternatives, The Vision Zero Street Design
Standard, VISION ZERO STREETS, https://www.visionzerostreets.org [https://perma.cc/
LR5W-3J89]; Nicole Schneider, Executive Director, Walk San Francisco, Vision
Zero and the Three E’s: Engineering, Enforcement, Education, Designing Cities
Conference: San Francisco 2014 (Oct. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Vision Zero and the
Three E’s], http://nacto.org/event/designing-cities-2014-vision-zero-and-the-three-esengineering-enforcement-education [https://perma.cc/6PS7-75WK].
37. See Vision Zero and the Three E’s, supra note 36.
38. See id.
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includes a goal of zero as the only acceptable number for traffic
fatalities and serious injuries, compared to a modest year-by-year
percentage reduction. Second, Vision Zero creates urgency and
measurable accountability by setting a date by which to achieve the
goal of zero. Measures applied by policymakers as part of Vision
Zero tend to include redesigning streets, lowering speed limits,
implementing impactful behavior change campaigns, and enhancing
data-driven traffic enforcement.39
Third, Vision Zero also
incorporates a multidisciplinary approach, bringing together diverse
stakeholders and government agencies to address the many causes of
traffic crashes, including local transportation departments, police,
prosecutors, public health departments, municipal vehicle fleet
management, and, as has become unique to U.S. Vision Zero efforts,
non-government actors including advocacy organizations, traffic
victims, and their families—who are often the ones advocating for
government adoption of Vision Zero.40
Finally, Vision Zero marks a shift in transportation planning
priorities. Transportation planning over the past sixty years has
prioritized what is known as “level of service,” a term traditionally
used by engineers and transportation planners to indicate how many
motor vehicles could be moved through a given stretch of road.41 The
more vehicles a stretch of road could accommodate per hour, the
greater the level of service.42 One way greater levels of service were
achieved was by increasing vehicle travel speeds, including raising
speed limits and adding and widening road lanes.43 However, more
vehicles traveling at higher speeds on wider roads lead to significantly
more dangerous and lethal road conditions for all road users,
including motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians.44 Wider roads and

39. What is Vision Zero?, VISION ZERO NETWORK, http://visionzeronetwork.org/
about/what-is-vision-zero [https://perma.cc/PWL7-6TWA].
40. Founded in 2014 in New York City, the group Families for Safe Streets
consists of individuals who have either lost someone to traffic violence or have been
injured themselves. The group advocates for safer streets and provides a peer
support network and resources for others with similar experiences. See generally
Families for Safe Streets, TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES, https://www.transalt.org/get
involved/familiesforsafestreets [https://perma.cc/WU5P-4J7F]. Similar groups using
similar names have since been established in several other cities in North America.
41. See Joe Linton, Report: “Multi-Modal Level of Service” Metrics Not Quite
Up to the Challenge, STREETSBLOG LA (Oct. 17, 2014), http://la.streetsblog.org/
2014/10/17/report-multi-modal-level-of-service-metrics-not-quite-up-to-the-challenge
[https://perma.cc/Y39P-UCL3].
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Lane Width, in URBAN STREET DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 36.
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travel lanes also mean greater crossing distances for pedestrians, thus
increasing their risk of exposure to lethal vehicles.45 Further, the
average motor vehicle traveling at twenty miles per hour has a
stopping distance of forty feet, and a pedestrian’s risk of death when
struck is five percent.46 By comparison, a vehicle travelling at forty
miles per hour has a stopping distance of 118 feet, and the risk of
pedestrian death jumps to eighty-five percent.47 And starting at fifty
miles per hour the risk of death upon impact is considered to be
nearly one hundred percent.48 Transportation planners and policy
makers throughout the country continue to prioritize high vehicle
speeds in an effort to increase the level of service, but do so at the
expense of human lives. High vehicle speeds are a significant reason
why tens of thousands continue to die in U.S. traffic every year.49 In
contrast to traditional traffic planning, Vision Zero seeks to prioritize
safety for all road users over the movement of vehicles and high
vehicle speeds, by implementing and enforcing lower speed limits,
narrowing road lanes to discourage speeding, and implementing
physical objects and traffic signaling to reduce dangerous turning
behavior by motorists, among several other measures.50 In NYC,
police have significantly increased enforcement of certain Vision
Zero violations, principally speeding and failure to yield to a
pedestrian.51
The additional measures that set the era of Vision Zero policies
apart from prior eras are often summarized as the two new E’s,
evaluation and equity,52 in addition to the traditional three E’s of
engineering, education, and enforcement. These new E’s have
45. See Dewan Masud Karim, Narrower Lanes, Safer Streets, RESEARCHGATE
(2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277590178_Narrower_Lanes_Safer_
Streets [https://perma.cc/ZZ44-KMXH].
46. See Design Speed, in URBAN STREET DESIGN GUIDE, supra note 36.
47. Id.
48. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY
PREVENTION 77-78 (Margie Peden et al. eds. 2004), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
10665/42871/1/9241562609.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2AH-V3H9].
49. See Safety on the Road, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, http://www.nsc.org/learn/
pages/nsc-on-the-road.aspx [https://perma.cc/X3QB-RAZZ].
50. See What is Vision Zero?, supra note 39. For several other measures, outside
the scope of this Article, used to address dangerous driving and traffic fatalities in the
United States, see 2016 Fatality Estimates, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL,
http://www.nsc.org/learn/NSC-Initiatives/Pages/Fatality-Estimates.aspx
[https://perma.cc/GKU7-HLR8].
51. VISION ZERO: YEAR THREE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
52. See CITY OF L.A., VISION ZERO LOS ANGELES: THE FACTS, http://visionzero.
lacity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/LA_VisionZero_FactSheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76CH-M6X5].
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become core tenets in many Vision Zero policies and are often
deemed necessary to reach zero.53 Evaluation is necessary to
establish accountability for the progress made—or lack thereof—on
the measures needed to reach the goal of zero; while achieving equity
is necessary to maintain the support for those measures by
stakeholders and to allocate resources to the locations and population
groups disproportionately affected by traffic violence, primarily Black
and Hispanic and lower-income populations, in order to rectify
historical inequities and higher rates of injuries and fatalities among
those groups.54
B.

Equity in Vision Zero

Equity in Vision Zero is the fair and just implementation of
transportation safety measures across all populations, including race,
age, gender, geography, and socio-economic status, and involves
engineering, education, and enforcement measures, considering both
past and current inequities.55 Where inequities exist, so do the
greatest and most disproportionate rates of traffic deaths and injuries.
For example, in U.S. cities, eighty-nine percent of high-income
communities have sidewalks, while only forty-nine percent of lowincome communities do.56 At the same time, African-Americans,
Native Americans, and Hispanic Americans, who live in low-income
communities at higher rates than White Americans, are at least twice
as likely to be killed while walking.57 These deaths are not
“accidents” but the foreseeable result of inadequate and inequitable
engineering and transportation policy decisions.58 Inequities are also
prevalent within traffic enforcement, particularly in the form of racial
53. Marco Conner, Racial Inequity in Traffic Enforcement, VISION ZERO CITIES:
INT’L J. TRAFFIC SAFETY INNOVATION, at 12, 14 (Mar. 2016), http://www.visionzero
cities.org/journal/dl/Vision_Zero_Cities_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DJX-86EP].
54. See Mike Maciag, Pedestrians Dying at Disproportionate Rates in America’s
Poorer Neighborhoods, GOVERNING (Aug. 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/
public-justice-safety/gov-pedestrian-deaths-analysis.html
[https://perma.cc/DF6VVDQQ].
55. See, e.g., SARA ZIMMERMAN ET AL., SAFE ROUTES TO SCH. NAT’L P’SHIP, AT
THE INTERSECTION OF ACTIVE TRANSPORTATION AND EQUITY 14-21 (2015),
http://www.saferoutespartnership.org/sites/default/files/pdf/At-the-Intersection-ofActive-Transportation-and-Equity.pdf [https://perma.cc/K77M-G6JJ] (providing an
in-depth discussion on the vast number of transportation inequities faced by lowincome people and people of color).
56. Maciag, supra note 54.
57. See Angie Schmitt, The Inequitable Toll of Pedestrian Deaths, STREETSBLOG
USA (May 7, 2013), http://usa.streetsblog.org/2013/05/07/the-inequitable-toll-ofpedestrian-deaths [https://perma.cc/J66M-K9YK].
58. See Maciag, supra note 54.
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disparities in who is stopped, searched, and ticketed.59 Additionally,
several studies have shown that drivers are significantly less likely to
stop for African-American and Hispanic adult pedestrians solely
because of the pedestrians’ race, thereby suggesting deep implicit
racial biases.60 Increasingly, Vision Zero stakeholders are recognizing
that addressing these inequities is a just and moral requirement that is
also necessary to achieve Vision Zero.61
III. RACIAL DISPARITIES IN POLICE TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT
To provide a basis for exploring the extent of racial inequities and
disparities in U.S. police traffic enforcement, it is necessary to
examine the different types of enforcement and ways that police
interact with drivers and other road users.
A. Understanding Police Traffic Enforcement
Police traffic enforcement can be categorized into three major
categories: traffic injury responses, traffic safety violations, and
discretionary traffic stops.62 Additionally, there are two broadly
defined stages to all enforcement: first, the initial police response up
to, but not including, arrest or ticketing of the driver (the first
enforcement stage), and second, from the decision to arrest or ticket
the driver, including subsequent prosecution, adjudication, and
penalty imposition (the second enforcement stage).

1.

Traffic Injury Responses

In traffic injury responses, a victim has been harmed, frequently by
a driver who made a dangerous driving choice, and police have
59. See infra Part III.
60. See, e.g., Courtney Coughenour et al., Examining Racial Bias as a Potential
Factor in Pedestrian Crashes, 98 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 96, 96-100
(2017),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S000145751630361X
[https://perma.cc/PDX6-9W62] (examining the potential for racial bias in driver
yielding behaviors at midblock crosswalks in low and high income neighborhoods
located in Las Vegas, Nevada); OTREC, Study Examines Racial Bias at Crosswalks,
PORTLAND ST. U. (May 19, 2014), https://www.pdx.edu/clas/news/study-examinesracial-bias-crosswalks [https://perma.cc/G859-4WWG] (examining recent findings
that “black pedestrians were passed by twice as many cars and waited nearly a third
longer to cross than white pedestrians”); see also Schmitt, supra note 57 (providing
more information about racial bias and traffic crash disparities based on age, gender,
and race).
61. See Laura Bliss, Vision Zero’s Troubling Blind Spot, CITYLAB (Sept. 1, 2016),
http://www.citylab.com/commute/2016/09/black-lives-matter-and-vision-zero/497495
[https://perma.cc/553R-YLMX].
62. See CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 59 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2014) (distinguishing traffic-safety
and investigatory stops).
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responded by pursuing a crash investigation and possible ticketing
and arrest. Because the police-response is precipitated by a crash
typically not witnessed by the police, racial bias by police is highly
unlikely to occur initially; indeed there is little, if any, evidence of
racial disparities within the first enforcement stage of traffic injury
crash responses.63
However, bias may occur in the second
enforcement stage when drivers are subject to criminal misdemeanor
and felony charges, as Black and Hispanic people are far more likely
to be arrested and receive less favorable plea offers and harsher
punishments than similarly situated White people.64 Black and
Hispanic people are also subjected to use of force by police at higher
rates, even after controlling for other extralegal and legal
characteristics such as income, education, and prior offenses.65
Research that isolates traffic-related policing is needed to determine
the extent and nature of racial disparities specifically in the second
enforcement stage of traffic injury responses.

2.

Traffic Safety Violations

Traffic safety violations are driving-offenses that are clearly
defined and inherently dangerous, like texting while driving,
speeding, drunk driving, and failing to yield to a vulnerable road user.
For drivers caught committing traffic safety violations, there is little
racial disparity in ticketing by police. Because such violations and
their penalties are clearly defined, there is little room for subjectivity,
giving police officers less discretion. Indeed, “the driver’s race (and
gender) has no relevance to the likelihood of being stopped” for a
traffic safety violation; rather, it is driving behavior that determines
police enforcement of most traffic-safety laws with clear connections
to dangerous driving.66 However, as with traffic injury responses, new
research is needed to assess whether racial disparities exist specifically
in the second enforcement stage of traffic safety violations, where
drivers have been ticketed and may dispute their charge, and in other
63. As of March 2017, the author identified no research confirming racial
disparities within the first enforcement stage of traffic injury responses by police in
the United States.
64. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 18, at 3; see also DAVID A. HARRIS,
ACLU, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS
(1999), https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nationshighways [https://perma.cc/8K4C-CTYT] (“Today, blacks constitute [just] 13 percent
of the country’s drug users; [but] 37 percent of those arrested on drug charges; 55
percent of those convicted; and 74 percent of all drug offenders sentenced to
prison.”).
65. See Engel & Calnon, supra note 9.
66. See EPP ET AL., supra note 62, at 72.
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ways engage with courts and administrative agencies in the
adjudication of their alleged offense.

3.

Discretionary Traffic Stops

In contrast to traffic safety violations and traffic injury responses,
discretionary, or investigatory, traffic stops exhibit widespread racial
disparities. Discretionary stops are typically police stops for relatively
minor violations like driving too slowly or failing to signal a vehicle’s
turn, or for when drivers fit a certain profile or otherwise raise the
suspicion of a police officer. They differ from stops for traffic safety
violations by the high level of subjectivity and discretion police
officers have in deciding whether, and how, to carry out a stop.
“[V]irtually all of the wide racial disparity in [police traffic
enforcement] is concentrated in one category of stops: discretionary
stops for minor violations of the law.”67 Several studies show that
Black drivers in the United States are more likely than White drivers
to be searched during stops, even though those Black drivers are less
likely to possess contraband,68 and account for a “disproportionate
share of traffic-stop deaths,” often instigated using racially based
pretexts.69 One study found that Black men aged fifty or older are as
likely as twenty-five-year-old White men to be stopped for a minor
offense and investigated while driving, despite a much lower
likelihood of criminal activity.70 These disparities and police practices
have been documented for several decades,71 and in numerous cases

67. Id.
68. See LaFraniere & Lehren, supra note 8; Kia Makarechi, What the Data
Really Says About Police and Racial Bias, VANITY FAIR (July 14, 2016, 3:09 PM),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/07/data-police-racial-bias
[https://perma.cc/V5ZD-FC8A] (“In San Francisco, ‘although Black people
accounted for less than 15 percent of all stops in 2015, they accounted for over 42
percent of all non-consent searches following stops.’ This proved unwarranted: ‘Of
all people searched without consent, Black and Hispanic people had the lowest ‘hit
rates’ (i.e., the lowest rate of contraband recovered).’ In 2015, whites searched
without consent were found to be carrying contraband at nearly two times the rate as
blacks who were searched without consent.”).
69. See Wesley Lowery, A Disproportionate Number of Black Victims in Fatal
Traffic Stops, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/a-disproportionate-number-of-black-victims-in-fatal-trafficstops/2015/12/24/c29717e2-a344-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html
[https://perma.cc/ZB4S-MLCV].
70. See EPP ET AL., supra note 62, at 67.
71. See, e.g., id. at 155 (finding that Black drivers in Chicago were 270 percent
more likely than White drivers to be subjected to an investigatory stop). See
generally Kathleen M. O’Day, Comment, Pretextual Traffic Stops: Protecting Our
Streets or Racist Police Tactics?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313 (1998) (discussing
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such discretionary traffic stops by police turn deadly for the driver. In
April of 2015, Walter Scott, age fifty, was shot in the back in North
Charleston, South Carolina, after being stopped by a police officer for
a broken taillight.72 Three months later, Samuel DuBose, age fortythree, was shot in the head after being stopped in Cincinnati, Ohio,
for lacking a front license plate on his car.73 And in July of 2016,
Philando Castile was shot and killed by a police officer near St. Paul,
Minnesota, with his girlfriend and her four year old daughter in the
car, while allegedly reaching for identification.74 According to police
radio transcripts, the officer stopped Mr. Castile because he believed
Mr. Castile looked like a suspect in a robbery due to his “wide-set
nose.”75 All three victims were African-American.
The shooting deaths of Walter Scott, Samuel DuBose, and
Philando Castile represent the most tragic outcomes of discretionary
traffic stops. But even when traffic stops do not turn fatal, their
consequences are widespread and long lasting. Discretionary traffic
stops mimic stop-and-frisk tactics common in major U.S. cities, and
are part of a policy of so-called “quality of life” or “broken windows”
policing, where minor offenses are targeted under the theory that this
prevents major crimes.76 Such traffic stops have become known as
“broken taillight policing,” where a violation relatively insignificant to
safety is aggressively and subjectively enforced.77 These practices
contribute significantly to the disparate stops of African-American
pretextual stops based on race and instances where police practices have been
documented as discriminatory).
72. See Mark Berman, South Carolina Police Officer in Walter Scott Shooting
Indicted on Murder Charge, WASH. POST (June 8, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/06/08/police-officer-who-shot-walter-scottindicted-for-murder [https://perma.cc/BTP9-H6QJ].
73. See Tana Weingartner, Campus Cop on Trial for Shooting Death During
Routine Traffic Stop, NPR (Oct. 25, 2016, 4:37 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/25
/499224917/campus-cop-on-trial-for-shooting-death-during-routine-traffic-stop
[https://perma.cc/ME5Z-JWPU].
74. Andy Mannix, Police Audio: Officer Stopped Philando Castile on Robbery
Suspicion, STAR TRIB. (July 12, 2016, 7:55 PM), http://www.startribune.com/policeaudio-officer-stopped-philando-castile-on-robbery-suspicion/386344001
[https://perma.cc/8XZ7-YU7H].
75. Id.
76. See Nick Pinto, NYPD Watchdog Shatters Bratton’s ‘Broken Windows’–Now
What?, VILLAGE VOICE (June 28, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://www.villagevoice.com/
news/nypd-watchdog-shatters-brattons-broken-windows-now-what-8796746
[https://perma.cc/A5PD-G87L].
77. See Jamelle Bouie, Broken Taillight Policing, SLATE (Apr. 8, 2015, 2:53 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/04/north_charleston_sh
ooting_how_investigatory_traffic_stops_unfairly_affect.html [https://perma.cc/6VX8FVUK].
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pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. In Tampa, Florida, almost
eighty percent of bicycle-related tickets issued by police during a
three-year period were to African-Americans, even though AfricanAmericans made up only twenty-five percent of the population.78
Similar disparities in enforcement against bicyclists exist throughout
New York City.79
Despite significant racially disparate results, our courts have
explicitly validated some of the practices that cause the disparities. In
the 1996 case Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court decided the
constitutionality of pretextual traffic stops, where police stop and
search vehicles based on actual or alleged minor traffic infractions.80
The Court held that “any traffic offense committed by a driver was a
legitimate legal basis for a stop, regardless of the officer’s subjective
state of mind.”81 The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) was
highly critical of the ruling and stated that:
In practice, the Whren decision has given the police virtually
unlimited authority to stop and search any vehicle they want. Every
driver probably violates some provision of the vehicle code at some
time during even a short drive, because state traffic codes identify so
many different infractions. For example, traffic codes define
precisely how long a driver must signal before turning . . . . Vehicle
equipment is also highly regulated. A small light bulb must
illuminate the rear license plate. Tail lights must be visible from a
particular distance . . . . And all equipment must be in working order
at all times. If the police target a driver for a stop and search, all
they have to do to come up with a pretext for a stop is follow the car
until the driver makes an inconsequential error or until a technical
violation is observed.82

78. See Alexandra Zayas & Kameel Stanley, How Riding Your Bike Can Land
You in Trouble with the Cops–If You’re Black, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 17, 2015,

3:46 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/how-riding-your-bike-canland-you-in-trouble-with-the-cops---if-youre-black/2225966 [https://perma.cc/SBR75P9M].
79. See Harry Levine & Loren Siegel, The Marijuana Arrest Research Project,
Presentation at CUNY School of Law Event, Summons: The Next Stop and Frisk
(Apr. 24, 2014), http://marijuana-arrests.com/docs/Criminal-Court-Summonses-inNYC--CUNY-Law-School-April-24-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MFF-SFLE].
In
New York City, between 2008 and 2011, an estimated twelve of the fifteen
neighborhoods with the most summonses for riding on the sidewalk were
predominantly Hispanic or African-American, while fourteen of the fifteen with the
fewest were primarily White. Id.
80. 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996).
81. See HARRIS, supra note 64.
82. Id.
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Still, despite the Court’s validation of pretextual stops, many police
practices related to discretionary stops have been found to violate the
First Amendment (including police action punishing people for
“talking back to officers” and “recording public police activities” in
connection with stops), the Fourth Amendment (including police
using excessive force, stopping and detaining people without
reasonable suspicion, or arresting people without probable cause, in
other words, failing to legally perform so-called Terry stops),83 and
the Fourteenth Amendment (including police exhibiting racial bias in
stops).84 Moreover, widespread use of discretionary stops and broken
taillight policing by police has no proven traffic safety benefit.85 It
likely does nothing to deter dangerous driving or reduce the carnage
of traffic fatalities and injuries on U.S. roads. The ACLU argues that,
for the related policing practice of stop-question-and-frisk, “[n]o
research has ever proven the effectiveness of New York City’s stopand-frisk regime, and the small number of arrests, summonses, and
guns recovered demonstrates that the practice is ineffective.”86 The
ALCU goes on to argue that crime data also does not support the
claim that the practice has made New York City safer: “While violent
crimes fell 29 percent in New York City from 2001 to 2010, other
large cities experienced larger violent crime declines without relying
on stop and frisk abuses: 59 percent in Los Angeles, 56 percent in
New Orleans, 49 percent in Dallas, and 37 percent in Baltimore.”87
The results of these discretionary and investigatory stops are the
disparate stopping, ticketing, and arresting of African-American
drivers, bicyclists, and pedestrians, which “erode individual liberty,
undermine democratic equality, and divide local communities by
83. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (describing the Court’s
framework for assessing the constitutionality of investigatory stops). See generally
Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
84. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 16, 24, 63 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV48-7ZU5] (finding violations of the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments by the Ferguson, Mo. Police Department).
85. See infra Section IV.B.
86. Stop-and-Frisk Myth Busters, NYCLU (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.nyclu.org/
sites/default/files/Mythbusters_08.30.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6L5-XEMC]. For a
detailed analysis of broken taillight policing, see HARRIS, supra note 64.
87. See Stop-and-Frisk Myth Busters, supra note 86. For additional information
showing the lack of crime-reduction from stop-and-frisk practices, see Michael P.
Venutra et al., Donald Trump Touted the Merits of Stop-and-Frisk. Here Are the
Facts, DNAINFO (Nov. 3, 2016, 4:59 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/newyork/20160927/east-harlem/donald-trump-stop-and-frisk-hillary-clinton-unconstitu
tional-donald-trump-presidential-debate-nypd [https://perma.cc/82U9-92XC].
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income, race, and ethnicity.”88 Discretionary stops, where a police
officer decides to stop a driver based on physical characteristics like a
“wide-set nose”,89 or because a person is bicycling in a predominantly
African-American neighborhood, contribute to what is known as
race-making practices.90 These practices reinforce racist stereotypes
about who is likely to engage in illegal activity, and signal to Black
residents that they should stay away from certain predominantly
White and higher-income neighborhoods. Broken taillight policing
criminalizes non-violent and non-criminal behavior, and has the
perverse effect of making drivers feel less safe and, far too often, ends
an individual’s life instead of saving a life.
From a public traffic safety perspective, the consequences of
widespread discretionary traffic stops are that enforcement resources
are spent on unwarranted stops, vehicle searches, and arrests, which
do little, if anything, to deter dangerous driving, and leave fewer
resources to respond effectively to traffic crashes involving injuries
and to perform traffic safety violation stops for more serious
dangerous driving offenses like drunk driving, speeding, failing to use
due care, failure to yield, and texting while driving. These offenses
are chronically under-enforced91 and result in the deaths and injuries
of thousands every month across the United States.92 They are also
the most prevalent factors among the group of driver actions that,
when combined, contribute to ninety-four percent of U.S. crashes.93
88. EPP ET AL., supra note 62, at 159.
89. The police officer who stopped and eventually shot Philando Castile described
Mr. Castile’s “wide-set nose” as looking like that of a robbery suspect. Mannix, supra
note 74.
90. See, e.g., Raygine DiAquoi, Dir. of the Office of Diversity Culture &
Inclusion & Assistant Professor of Clinical Sociomedical Scis., Mailman Sch. of Pub.
Health, Address at the Columbia University Food for Thought Seminar, Symbols in
the Strangefruit Seeds: What the Talk Black Parents Have with Their Sons Tells Us
About Racism (Oct. 5, 2016), https://livestream.com/mailman/events/6428228
[https://perma.cc/CB98-4JQQ].
91. For under-enforcement of texting while driving, see Editorial, Adults Need to
Turn off the Phone While Driving, DAY (June 22, 2010, 5:42 AM),
http://www.theday.com/article/20100622/OP01/306229963
[https://perma.cc/K8URA3NJ]. For under-enforcement of alcohol-impaired driving, see LAURENCE H. ROSS,
CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING: SOCIAL POLICY FOR SAVING LIVES (1994), and
Laurence H. Ross, Social Control Through Deterrence: Drinking-and-Driving Laws,
10 ANN. REV. SOC. 21 (1984) [hereinafter Social Control Through Deterrence]. For
under-enforcement of other vehicular offenses, see TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES, JUSTICE
DENIED: NEW YORK CITY’S DISTRICT ATTORNEYS PLEAD OUT OF VISION ZERO 11
(2015), https://www.transalt.org/sites/default/files/news/reports/2015/Justice_Denied_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PCF-KX2U].
92. See supra Part I.
93. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
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The inefficiencies and racial disparities in current traffic
enforcement practices require a new approach. In order to achieve
the Vision Zero goal of eliminating traffic fatalities and serious
injuries, traffic enforcement must focus solely on responding
efficiently to all injurious and fatal traffic crashes and on the traffic
safety violations that cause the most physical harm.
IV. DETERRENCE AND DANGEROUS DRIVING
A. Mothers Against Drunk Driving: Inspiration for Effective
Enforcement
Despite the deep inequities that result from certain police
enforcement, traffic enforcement can, when used appropriately,
contribute significantly to the cultural change necessary to reduce
dangerous driving behavior, traffic fatalities, and injuries. The effort
in the United States to eliminate drunk and alcohol impaired driving
provides a useful example. Since the early 1980s, the annual number
of drunk driving deaths in the United States has decreased from
approximately 25,000 to nearly 10,000 in 2013.94 This is attributed to
increased frequency and certainty of apprehension for drunk driving
and the public perception of increased risk of apprehension. It
involved new legal sanctions, a lower maximum blood alcohol content
allowed, high visibility enforcement such as sobriety checkpoints,
repeated declarations by police and prosecutors that drunk driving
was not tolerated, public awareness campaigns, and victims-based
advocacy.95 The cultural change was led by the group Mothers
Against Drunk Driving (“MADD”), born out of tragedy after
founder Candace Lightner’s thirteen year old daughter, Cari, was

94. Compare NAT’L CTR. FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1993: ALCOHOL (1993), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/
Api/Public/ViewPublication/93F1 [https://perma.cc/9CVP-3365], with NAT’L CTR.
FOR STAT. & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2013:
ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING (2014), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/
ViewPublication/812102 [https://perma.cc/46GU-K6TR].
95. See infra Section IV.B. In addition to these measures, MADD has called for
the following measures to end alcohol impaired driving, which contributes to
approximately twenty-five percent of U.S. traffic fatalities: in-car breathalyzers for
all drunk drivers to prove they are sober before their car will start; mandatory blood
alcohol testing for death and serious injury crashes; open container restrictions in
vehicles; enforcement of underage drinking laws; and development of a nationwide
legal limit of .08 blood alcohol content while operating a motor vehicle. See MADD’s
Campaign, MADD, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/campaign [https://perma.cc/
RS54-U7Z4?type=image].
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killed by a drunk driver.96 Formed in 1980, MADD helped make
drunk driving socially unacceptable. The cultural change was also
facilitated by several different level government entities across the
United States that became involved and made repeated public
admonishments against drunk driving.97 Despite criticism by some
that MADD increasingly focused on excessively punitive penalties,98
the efforts to eliminate drunk driving, still led by MADD today, and
the remarkable reduction in drunk driving deaths since the 1980s can
provide insight into how enforcement measures can deter other types
of dangerous driving.
A 2016 survey by the National Safety Council showed that
“[a]lthough 83% of drivers surveyed believe driving is a safety
concern, a startling number say they are comfortable speeding (64%)
[and] texting either manually or through voice controls (47%),”
whereas far fewer (10%) say they are comfortable driving after they
feel they’ve had too much alcohol.99 This indicates that, while drunk
driving has become socially unacceptable, most other forms of
dangerous driving have not.
B.

Understanding Deterrence

To understand the factors that have contributed to the reduction of
drunk driving-related deaths by over fifty percent since 1980,100 and
how they may be augmented and applied to other types of dangerous
driving, this Section will examine deterrence theory and the factors
known to create both individual and general public deterrence of
harmful and illegal acts.
Deterrence can be understood as the threat or expectation of
undesirable consequences discouraging individuals from certain
behavior.101 Such consequences range from a civil monetary fine, to

96. See May 03 1980: MADD Founder’s Daughter Killed by Drunk Driver,
HISTORY.COM (May 3, 2009), http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/maddfounders-daughter-killed-by-drunk-driver [https://perma.cc/7BGV-FJYM].
97. See, e.g., Drunk Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drunk-driving
[https://perma.cc/66V7-AJSW];
Safety Report on Eliminating Impaired Driving–Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L
TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD (May 14, 2013), https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/
2013_Impaired_Driving_BMG-FAQs.aspx [https://perma.cc/E6VM-N5MX].
98. See, e.g., MADD Struggles to Remain Relevant, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2002),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/aug/6/20020806-035702-2222r
[https://perma.cc/NYQ3-UGBB].
99. 2016 Fatality Estimates, supra note 50.
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
101. See Deterrence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/deterrence [https://perma.cc/S6V5-43KY].
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incarceration, to points on your driver’s license and to being viewed
negatively by other people—particularly family and friends.

1.

Initial vs. Residual Deterrence and Specific vs. General
Deterrence

When assessing the efficacy of deterrence measures, we distinguish
between initial and residual deterrence, and between specific and
general deterrence. Initial deterrence is achieved when the threat of
legal consequences temporarily discourages potential offenders from
an illegal act, while residual deterrence is achieved when such threat
discourages potential illegal acts over a longer period of time.102
Specific deterrence, also known as individual deterrence, is when the
threat of future legal consequences discourages an individual, who
has already experienced legal or other forms of undesired
consequences, from re-committing a particular act, in other words,
from re-offending; by contrast, general deterrence is achieved when
the threat of mainly legal consequences discourages numerous
individuals who have never experienced such consequences, typically
the general public, from committing an offense.103 The least effective
deterrent outcome is when a policy measure achieves only initial
specific deterrence—impacting a single person for a short period of
time—and the optimal outcome is achieving residual general
deterrence where the general public is disincentivized for a longer
period of time from committing a harmful act.104

2.

Perceptions of Likely Apprehension and Legal Consequences

According to basic deterrence theory, individuals are more likely
to be deterred when legal or other negative consequences are likely,
administered swiftly after an illegal act, and severe enough to
outweigh the rewards of that illegal act; individuals are less likely to
be deterred when legal consequences are unlikely, remote in time,
and their severity is tolerable by that person.105 However, individuals
sometimes act irrationally, impulsively, and emotionally,106 have

102. See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Crackdowns: Initial and
Residual Deterrence, 12 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2-3 (1990).
103. See Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and
Specific Deterrence, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 123, 123 (1993).
104. See Sherman, supra note 102.
105. See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence by a
Criminologist for Economists, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 83, 85 (2013).
106. See Alex R. Piquero et al., Elaborating the Individual Difference Component
in Deterrence Theory, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 335, 335, 356 (2011) (providing a
more context-based analysis of the rational choice model with regards to deterrence).
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different moral inhibitions,107 and often misjudge the actual legal
consequences of illegal activity,108 making basic deterrence theory less
reliable. Ultimately, whether individuals are deterred depends not on
the potential legal consequences, such as a fine or incarceration, but
on their perceptions of such consequences, as well as their mental
state at the time of an act, their moral inhibitions, and their social
bonds. Individuals construct their risk assessments of consequences
based on public threat communication (e.g., public sanction
awareness campaigns and police visibility) and on personal and
vicarious experiences, including family and friends—which means
individuals are heavily influenced by what is considered socially
acceptable.109 Most importantly, empirical research shows that
perceived “certainty of apprehension [and legal consequences], not
the severity of the ensuing legal consequence, is the more effective
deterrent.”110 Indeed, increased perceived certainty of apprehension
and legal consequences has consistent general deterring effects on
drunk driving, speeding, and running a red light,111 whereas increased
severity of legal consequences has no reliable deterring effects.112
Methods to achieve such perceptions may include publicized police
checkpoints, publicized and frequent police enforcement actions,
speed and red light cameras, and high profile public awareness
campaigns about the consequences of dangerous driving.113
Additionally, the fact that optimal deterrence depends primarily on
the perceived certainty of apprehension and legal consequences “has
important policy implications, among which are that lengthy prison

107. See Alex Piquero & Raymond Paternoster, An Application of Stafford and
Warr’s Reconceptualization of Deterrence to Drinking and Driving , 35 J. RES. CRIME

& DELINQUENCY 3, 3 (1998).
108. See Bill McCarthy, New Economics of Sociological Criminology, 28 ANN.
REV. SOC. 417, 420 (2002).
109. See Piquero & Paternoster, supra note 107.
110. Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST.
199, 199 (2013), http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/670398
[https://perma.cc/W4V9-BYAF].
111. See William DeJong & Ralph Hingson, Strategies to Reduce Driving Under
the Influence of Alcohol, 19 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 359, 364-65 (1998); Bryan E.
Porter et al., Turning Off the Cameras: Red Light Running Characteristics and Rates
After Photo Enforcement Legislation Expired, 50 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 1104, 1110 (2013) (showing how deterrent effect of red light cameras
that had been turned off decreased as time passed and awareness of lack of
enforcement increased).
112. See Dieter Dölling et al., Is Deterrence Effective? Results of a Meta-Analysis
of Punishment, 15 EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 201, 210-12 (2009); Nagin, supra
note 110.
113. For discussion and more examples, see infra Section V.A.
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sentences and mandatory minimum sentencing cannot be justified on
deterrence.”114

3.

Legitimacy: Justice as Fairness115

In addition to perceptions of apprehension and legal consequences,
people’s perception of a policy as just and legitimate is also critical to
achieve optimal deterrence. Legal consequences that the public feels
are unjust can erode trust in the legal system and result in nonenforcement.116 For example, the New York Police Department
(“NYPD”) has largely ignored jaywalking in NYC for decades despite
its near universal prevalence. And when then Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani instructed police officers to actively enforce jaywalking, a
statutory offense, many officers simply refused to comply, as did the
public at large.117 Penalizing jaywalking in NYC was and is generally
considered unjust and unfair by New Yorkers; consequently, the
attempt to do so failed. Perceived unjust legal consequences can also
result in more “not guilty” pleas, more requests for jury trials, court
backlogs, lower conviction rates, and greater strains throughout the
criminal justice system.118
Finally, a powerful predictor of compliance with a policy or law is
whether such measure is viewed as legitimate. Procedural justice, as
shown by Professor Tracy L. Meares, is the most important indicator
of that perceived legitimacy or illegitimacy.119 Four factors determine
whether a police traffic stop or enforcement policy is viewed as
procedurally just and, by extension, as fair and legitimate. The first is
114. Nagin, supra note 110. A need exists for research to determine if there is a
minimum level of penalty, in the form of incarceration or monetary sanctions, below
which a lesser general deterrent effect is achieved or individual re-offending
increases, and above which any further increase has no additional deterring effect.
115. The Rawlsian concept of justice as fairness stipulates that every individual has
an equal right to basic liberties, and without such fair and equal rights justice cannot
be realized. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (original ed. 1971).
116. See Social Control Through Deterrence, supra note 91, at 33.
117. See Kit R. Roane, Police Balk at Crackdown on Jaywalkers by Giuliani , N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 8, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/08/nyregion/police-balk-atcrackdown-on-jaywalkers-by-giuliani.html [https://perma.cc/Z3GV-W6XA].
118. See generally Social Control Through Deterrence, supra note 91, at 30-32.
119. See Tracey Meares, The Legitimacy of Police Among Young AfricanAmerican Men, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 651, 659 (2009); Tracey L. Meares, Professor, Yale
Law Sch., Procedural Justice: The Secret Ingredient?, Address at Community Justice
2014 (Apr. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Procedural Justice: The Secret Ingredient?],
http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/procedural-justice-secret-ingredient-traceyl-meares-community-justice-2014 [https://perma.cc/6VT4-9FKP]; see also POLICE
EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, LEGITIMACY AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A NEW
ELEMENT OF POLICE LEADERSHIP (Craig Fischer ed. 2014), http://www.police
forum.org/free-online-documents [https://perma.cc/88KP-UXAJ].
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voice—whether affected communities have been able to play a
formative role in the development of the policy, and whether
individuals who are stopped have an opportunity to express to the
officer the circumstances of their actions preceding the stop.120 The
second is decision neutrality and fairness—whether the stop,
ticketing, arrest, or adjudication are performed fairly and without
bias.121 The third is respectful treatment—whether individuals
believe they are treated with dignity and respect when stopped.122
And the fourth is trustworthiness—whether stopped individuals
perceive the officer or other enforcement agent as trustworthy.123
Policing that meets these four criteria can generally be described as
procedurally just and should be the goal of all enforcement agencies
that seek to increase compliance with traffic safety laws and reduce
dangerous driving. Research shows that when individuals perceive an
enforcement encounter and adjudication as fair and legitimate, they
are more likely to comply and follow that law in the future, regardless
of the outcome of their initial case or ticketing.124
V. ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE TRAFFIC
ENFORCEMENT IN THE AGE OF VISION ZERO

“Policing cannot be judged only by an absence of crime, it must be
measured by the presence of justice.”125
For cities and jurisdictions that have adopted Vision Zero, and for
those who share its goals, traffic enforcement should primarily be
devoted towards achieving the greatest long-lasting and general
public deterrence against dangerous driving, in order to eliminate
traffic fatalities and serious injuries. Additionally, jurisdictions must
recognize that unconstitutional and illegitimate policing, and racial
disparities in discretionary traffic stops, are both morally
unacceptable and counterproductive to deterring dangerous driving.
Having explored lessons of police traffic enforcement and deterrence
in Part IV of this Article, this Part will advance ways of applying such
lessons in the traffic enforcement context and argue that these

See Procedural Justice: The Secret Ingredient?, supra note 119.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See LAPD Chief Charlie Beck’s Testimony: President Obama’s Task Force
on 21st Century Policing, L.A. CMTY. POLICING, http://www.lacp.org/2015-Articles120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Main/020615-ChiefBeck-on21stCenturyPolicing.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2017).

[https://perma.cc/5VST-49M5]
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methods must be the focus of Vision Zero if its goals are to be
achieved.
A. Achieving Effective Traffic Enforcement: Deterrence Lessons
Applied
As discussed in Part IV, lengthy prison sentences and mandatory
minimum sentencing laws are unlikely to deter dangerous driving.
Instead, optimally effective deterrence measures must create the
public perception that apprehension for illegal activity is likely, that
enforcement is consistent and sustained, that legal consequences for
criminal activity are probable, and that enforcement policy, legal
sanctions, and interactions with enforcement agents are just,
legitimate, and fair. Deterrence measures must also consider the
resources and abilities of police and other enforcement entities to
impose legal sanctions. Indeed, “[enforcement] should be highly
visible, sustained and widespread. If enforcement is not consistent
and visible, drivers will revert to dangerous behavior.”126
In applying these lessons, enforcement agencies should
significantly increase high-visibility deterrence measures, including
sobriety checkpoints to address impaired driving, high-profile
enforcement actions against reckless driving preceded and followed
by media campaigns, “pre-enforcement” actions such as widespread
distribution of informational palm cards that educate drivers about
dangerous driving choices,127 and vocal admonishment by agency
leaders against dangerous driving, which includes using press
conferences, public statements, and media dissemination to raise
general public awareness of legal consequences. These measures
must be widespread, consistent, and sustained, which means they
must be applied as part of routine hourly and daily traffic
enforcement, as opposed to occasional seasonal actions, and at similar
high levels of application by adjacent police precincts and
jurisdictions in order to create a uniform and broad perception of

126. TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES, PROVEN TACTICS, BETTER ENFORCEMENT: HOW TO
SAVE LIVES ON NYC STREETS 11 (2013), https://www.transalt.org/sites/
default/files/news/reports/2013/Proven_Tactics,_Better_Enforcement_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9UWH-YA8P]; see also Jeremy D. Davey & James E. Freeman,
Improving Road Safety Through Deterrence-Based Initiatives, 11 SULTAN QABOOS
U. MED. J. 29 (2011), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3074684
[https://perma.cc/TRD7-E9KA].
127. See NYC Steps Up Pedestrian Safety Efforts, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH &
SAFETY (Oct. 28, 2016), https://ohsonline.com/articles/2016/10/28/nyc-steps-uppedestrian-safety-efforts.aspx [https://perma.cc/49QX-NXYR].
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likely apprehension for dangerous driving.128 Unarmed enforcement
agents typically tasked with issuing only parking-related tickets,
should be empowered to enforce non-felonious traffic safety offenses
like speeding and failing to yield.
Automated enforcement
technology, like speed cameras, discussed later in this Article, may be
the most effective tool to achieve widespread and consistent traffic
enforcement and should be applied broadly.
To ensure these measures are legitimate and perceived as just by
drivers and the general public, enforcement agencies should involve
the public through public service announcements and awareness
campaigns that explain the safety aspects of relevant measures, and
should precede select enforcement actions with warnings, giving
drivers the opportunity to self-adjust behavior. To achieve optimal
legitimacy, enforcement agencies should be highly transparent and
share aggregate case data and enforcement procedures publicly
online as frequently as possible. Above all, traffic enforcement must
be data-driven, targeting the most dangerous actions that contribute
to the most crashes. This means targeting offenses like speeding,
drunk driving, failing to yield, and texting by drivers, and focusing far
less on bicycling on the sidewalk, tinted windows, and other offenses
relatively insignificant to traffic safety.129 It also involves severely
reducing and possibly eliminating so-called quality-of-life and broken
taillight enforcement.130
For police responding to traffic injury crashes, achieving swift
adjudication and legal consequences should be prioritized for

128. See TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES, DEATH, DANGER AND IGNORING THE DATA:
HOW THE NYPD IS GETTING VISION ZERO WRONG 5, 10 (2016),
https://www.transalt.org/sites/default/files/news/reports/2016/Death_Danger_and_Ign
oring_the_Data_How_the_NYPD_is_Getting_Vision_Zero_Wrong_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8J34-TE8C]; see also NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., HIGH-VISIBILITY ENFORCEMENT ON DRIVER COMPLIANCE
WITH PEDESTRIAN RIGHT-OF-WAY LAWS 30 (2013), https://www.nhtsa.gov/
sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/811786.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL35-YR76]; NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., THE EFFECT OF HIGH-VISIBILITY
ENFORCEMENT ON DRIVER COMPLIANCE WITH PEDESTRIAN RIGHT-OF-WAY LAWS 1,
17-18 (2017), https://one.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/812364_HighVisibilityEnfDriver
CompPeds4YearFollowUp.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EPJ-XQDK] (indicating that high
visibility enforcement continues to have a deterring effect on dangerous driving four
years after enforcement, with no similar enforcement during the interim).
129. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, SUMMARY OF MOTOR VEHICLE
CRASHES 4 tbl. 7 (2015), https://dmv.ny.gov/statistic/2014-nyscrashsummary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZM8-J2CM] (showing the negligible effect tinted windows have on
traffic crashes, injuries, and fatalities).
130. See supra Section III.A.3 for a discussion about the role and impacts of
quality-of-life and broken taillight enforcement.
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maximum deterrence, even at the expense of seeking more severe
penalties; resources that are freed up as a consequence should be
redirected to achieve more widespread enforcement. Agencies
should consider expedited and far more frequent drivers’ license
suspensions and revocations, especially against people repeatedly
convicted of dangerous driving offenses.131 Police should also
increase the capacity to quickly investigate traffic injury crashes to
improve the ability to penalize drivers, and to raise the expectation of
swift apprehension and legal consequences.132
B.

Automated Enforcement Technology

Despite positive deterrence effects from widespread and high
visibility traffic enforcement, the likelihood of apprehension for
driving offenses is limited by the size and resources of the police
force.133
Even during police crackdowns, the likelihood of
apprehension for speeding, drunk driving, red light running, and
unlicensed driving remains low. For example, one study estimated
that approximately thirteen million violations occurred in one year
across the United States by drivers failing to stop when a school bus
stop-arm was engaged, with the vast majority of those violations
unenforced.134 Additionally, the likelihood of apprehension for
driving offenses is limited by the willingness of police to apprehend
dangerous drivers, officers’ considerations of disruptions to traffic
flow, safety issues related to stopping a driver, and responsibilities
related to ticketing a driver, in the form of paperwork and potential
131. Enforcement agencies should also consider requiring the surrender of vehicle
registration and license plates from repeat unlicensed driving offenders, given that
unlicensed drivers are more than two-and-a-half times as likely to be involved in a
fatal crash compared to licensed drivers. See Albert Sabat, Highest Fatality Rates
from Unlicensed Drivers in California , ABC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/unlicensed-drivers-higher-rates-fatalcrashes-california/story?id=18239481 [https://perma.cc/6BNQ-LZ3V].
Moreover,
approximately half of the drivers who leave the scene of a fatal crash are unlicensed
to drive. See AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, UNLICENSED TO KILL 14 (2011),
https://www.aaafoundation.org/sites/default/files/2011Unlicensed2Kill.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97QM-2UEW].
132. See, e.g., VISION ZERO: YEAR THREE REPORT, supra note 1, at 42 (discussing
how the NYPD is considering expanding the criteria for when their Collision
Investigation Squad responds to traffic injury crashes and conducts an investigation).
133. See generally Bruce L. Benson et al., Can Police Deter Drunk Driving?, 32
APPLIED ECON. 357, 357-64 (2000).
134. See Bryan J. Katz, Camera Enforcement of School Bus Stop Arm Violations,
Presentation at the NHTSA Symposium, School Transportation Safety: Thinking
Outside the Bus (Dec. 1, 2016), https://one.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/symposiums/december
2016/assets/Camera_Enforcement_School_Bus_Stop_Arm_Bar_Violations_Presentat
ion.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3KJ-CSVC].
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court appearances.135 Finally, implicit racial bias and use of force
with potential lethal consequences are inherent risks of police traffic
stops.136
Automated enforcement technology provides a highly effective
solution to address the challenges and limitations of traditional traffic
enforcement.137 Today, speed and red light enforcement cameras are
the most common automated enforcement technologies, while more
recent types include cameras that detect offenses for failing to yield,
illegally occupying a bus lane, and failing to stop for a stopped school
bus with students boarding or exiting.138 The safety benefits from
these technologies are significant. In cities in Washington State with
speed enforcement cameras, speeds dropped by thirty percent during
the first year of a school zone speed safety program and violations
decreased by eighty-two percent in the first six months.139 In NYC,
the typical speed enforcement camera reduces speeding violations by
fifty percent within its first year of operation,140 and reduces injury
crashes within five hundred feet of a fixed speed camera by over

135. See Laurence H. Ross, The Neutralization of Severe Penalties: Some Traffic
Law Studies, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 403, 412 (1976); Joseph A. Schafer & Stephen D.
Mastrofski, Police Leniency in Traffic Enforcement Encounters: Exploratory
Findings from Observations and Interviews, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 225, 226 (2005).
136. See supra Section III.A.3.
137. See generally KATHY LINDQUIST, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF TRANSP.,

AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS: SYNTHESIS (2007), http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/
NR/rdonlyres/A5E3943E-5C43-4966-89ED-E0F12EE2A7FA/0/AutomatedEnforce
mentSynthesisTrepanier605.pdf [https://perma.cc/749S-BPAY] (a synopsis of several
studies showing reductions in dangerous driving following the implementation of
automated enforcement systems).
138. See Law Enforcement–Vision Zero, N.Y.C., http://www.nyc.gov/html/vision
zero/pages/law-enforcement/law-enforcement.html
[https://perma.cc/5PT8-TX95];
Vision Zero, AM. TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, https://www.atsol.com/vision-zero
[https://perma.cc/67TM-S47C]. For other types of increasingly popular technologies
capable of detecting and reporting dangerous driving, including so-called in-vehicle
“black boxes” and applications using mobile phone sensors, see N.Y.C. TAXI &
LIMOUSINE COMM’N, VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGY: SECOND REPORT (2016),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/second_vehicle_safety_technology_report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRW8-DS48].
139. See CITY OF DES MOINES, SCHOOL SAFETY PROGRAM: 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT,
http://desmoineswa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/3009
[https://perma.cc/WHN8-U3T9]; Nicholas Deshais, Spokane to Test Speed Cameras
in
School
Zones,
SPOKESMAN-REV.
(Dec.
11,
2014),
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/dec/11/spokane-to-test-speed-cameras-inschool-zones [https://perma.cc/HHB7-SN7Z].
140. See Mayor Bill de Blasio Announces 2015 Was Officially the Safest Year Ever
on New York City Streets, N.Y.C. (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/069-16/mayor-bill-de-blasio-2015-was-officially-safest-year-ever-newyork-city-streets [https://perma.cc/4TMA-SG7F].
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thirteen percent.141 Other cities which use speed enforcement
cameras have reduced their fatal and serious injury crashes by thirty
to forty percent.142 Red light cameras have reduced the number of
injury and fatal crashes by thirty percent, even though their effect on
the number of total crashes is uncertain.143 Part of the reason for
these significant reductions is that automated cameras can identify far
more violations than individual enforcement officers. In 2016, speed
enforcement cameras in NYC caught ten times as many speeding
drivers as police officers did, issuing 1.37 million tickets compared to
the 137,000 issued by police officers,144 a difference compounded by
the fact that state law only allowed the operation of a small number of
cameras during limited days and hours—restrictions that are common
in the United States, where automated enforcement has faced
political opposition in some jurisdictions.145 These numbers show that
speeding is a widespread and constant occurrence, with police officers
likely catching less than one percent of all speeding violations.146

141. See Jason Mick, Cash Grab or Life Saver? NYC Speeding Ticket Cameras
Scrutinized in New Report, DAILYTECH (Feb. 25, 2015, 5:04 PM),
http://www.dailytech.com/Cash+Grab+or+Life+Saver+NYC+Speeding+Ticket+Cam
eras+Scrutinized+in+New+Report/article37198.htm [https://perma.cc/65X9-NGAA]

(data comparing the last four months of 2014 and the same period of 2013).
142. Cecilia Wilson et al., Do Speed Cameras Reduce Road Traffic Crashes,
Injuries and Deaths?, COCHRANE (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.cochrane.org/
CD004607/INJ_do-speed-cameras-reduce-road-traffic-crashes-injuries-and-deaths
[https://perma.cc/3XRE-EG43].
143. Amy Aeron-Thomas & Stephane Hess, ‘Red-light Cameras’ Cut Casualty
Crashes at Junctions with Traffic Lights, COCHRANE (Apr. 20, 2005),
http://www.cochrane.org/CD003862/INJ_red-light-cameras-cut-casualty-crashes-atjunctions-with-traffic-lights [https://perma.cc/RK95-Z7Q8].
For a more recent
discussion on the benefits of red-light cameras, see Ben Fried, There Is No Doubt
That Automated Traffic Enforcement Saves Lives, STREETSBLOG NYC (Feb. 20,
2014), http://nyc.streetsblog.org/2014/02/20/there-is-no-doubt-that-automated-trafficenforcement-save-lives [https://perma.cc/VD7Z-WC5Y].
144. Brad Aaron, Cuomo Can Save Lives by Unshackling NYC’s Speed Camera
Program, STREETSBLOG NYC (Jan. 27, 2017), http://nyc.streetsblog.org/2017/01/27/
cuomo-can-save-lives-by-unshackling-nycs-speed-camera-program
[https://perma.cc/W5PB-XAM7].
145. For information on the opposition to and support of automated enforcement
cameras, see Joe Sharkey, The Collision over Traffic Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (July 4,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/business/05road.html [https://perma.cc/
U3N7-U7V4].
146. This calculation was made by the author, based on a hypothetical situation
with at least four speed enforcement cameras in each NYC school zone, using
conservative numbers of 1200 school zones, and two million speeding violations
registered for every 140 school zones, totaling to approximately seventeen million
speeding violations by cameras in one year, compared to 137,000 (or 0.8%) by police
officers, further assuming that cameras capture only a fraction of the actual speeding
violations that occur. However, police officers can likely achieve a degree of visible
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Because of cost and personnel limitations, automated enforcement
may be the only viable tool currently available to achieve the type of
widespread, uniform, and sustained enforcement necessary to deter
the most prevalent and dangerous traffic safety violations, and allow
police resources to be redirected towards other public policy
measures.147
Additionally, automated enforcement technology is an
indispensable tool to prevent the racial disparities and potentially
lethal use of force that are inherent risks of traffic stops by police
officers. Enforcement cameras wholly avoid interaction between the
driver and officer, which can benefit all parties, and they can be
operated in ways that eliminate any possibility of racialized bias or
targeting.148
Some cities operate their speed and red light
enforcement programs without any involvement from police, which
may increase the trust in the programs by communities exposed to
illegitimate policing. To further ensure that automated enforcement
technology is considered legitimate, cities should ensure that resulting
fines are kept low, devote all net revenue to traffic safety measures,
maintain robust procedures to appeal tickets and ensure due process,
educate the public about the safety benefits of the technology, and
issue only warnings to drivers during the initial period of operation.149
enforcement that cameras cannot, which is a critical component in deterring
dangerous driving.
147. See ANDREW HOOKE ET AL., HOME OFFICE POLICE RESEARCH GRP., PAPER
NO. 20, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC LIGHT & SPEED CAMERAS 41 (1996),
http://www.forensictv.net/Downloads/scientific_studies/cost_benefit_analysis_of_traff
icllight_and_speed_cameras_by_hooke_et_al.pdf [https://perma.cc/39NW-7J83].
148. First, laser sensors can ensure that cameras are only triggered when a motorist
speeds or runs a red light. Second, the cameras can be positioned to capture only the
license plate and other necessary vehicle characteristics, but not the physical features
of the driver. Third, records can be kept for a short period of time with access limited
to only the person ticketed and other narrowly defined government entities and
agents—primarily the government ticketing authority and its narrowly defined
agents, and police and prosecutors only with a warrant when camera footage or other
data may support a claim of criminality based on probable cause.
149. For more information on best practices for enforcement cameras, see
Research Suggests Guidelines for Credible Camera Enforcement, INS. INST. FOR
HIGHWAY SAFETY (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.iihs.org/iihs/sr/statusreport/article
/47/9/2 [https://perma.cc/W4UX-Q798]. For more information about opposition to
speed and red light cameras, including the U.S. states that have prohibited the
technology, see Emmarie Huetteman, Traffic Cameras Draw More Scrutiny by
States, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/us/trafficcameras-draw-more-scrutiny-by-states.html
[https://perma.cc/9EYR-QSJG].
However, despite opposition, courts have upheld the constitutionality of camera
programs, stating that “[camera] enforcement policies neither burden a fundamental
right nor target a suspect class.” See Dixon v. District of Columbia, 666 F.3d 1337,
1339 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Federal Appeals Court Embraces DC Speed Cameras,
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Finally, automated enforcement technology likely provides the
optimal solution to address the racial inequities that result from the
negative socioeconomic effects of traffic-related penalties, and the
race-based disparities of who is struck, injured, and killed in traffic
incidents. For example, although penalties in certain cities for
violations caught by cameras are similar to those caught by police
officers, some cities’ speed enforcement camera programs issue fines
as low as fifty dollars without regard to the rate of speed in excess of
the limit, and result in no punitive points on a driver or vehicle
owner’s record, including their insurance record.150 This is in contrast
to tickets issued by police officers for speeding, which can result in
fines up to six hundred dollars, imprisonment, and punitive points on
driving records and insurance records.151 As a result, for Black and
Hispanic drivers, who are disproportionately low-income, the
economic impact of a speeding ticket tends to be far less harmful
when issued using automated enforcement technology rather than
when issued by a police officer. Moreover, a poll from 2016 found
that Black, Hispanic, and lower-income New Yorkers are far more
likely than other groups to support the introduction of more speed
enforcement cameras.152 This shows that those disproportionately
struck, injured, and killed in traffic, namely Black, Hispanic, and
lower-income residents, also desire automated enforcement to

THENEWSPAPER.COM (Dec. 22, 2011), https://www.thenewspaper.com/news/36/
3670.asp [https://perma.cc/Z68Q-482J].
150. For a concise overview of different cities’ automated enforcement camera
programs, including different fee schedules, see OFF. OF THE CONTROLLER-CITY
SERVS. AUDITOR, CITY & CTY. OF S.F., AUTOMATED SPEED ENFORCEMENT
IMPLEMENTATION: SURVEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM AROUND THE
COUNTRY (2015).
151. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1180(h)(1) (McKinney 2016); About the NYS
Driver Point System, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, https://dmv.ny.gov/
tickets/about-nys-driver-point-system [https://perma.cc/93KS-AAP4].
152. See Brian Zumhagen, NYC Voters Overwhelmingly Back Speed Safety
Cameras for #EverySchool, TRANSP. ALTERNATIVES (Feb. 8, 2017),
https://www.transalt.org/news/releases/10089 [https://perma.cc/52HE-U4XM] (poll
conducted by Penn Schoen Berland in November 2016). Several other studies show
widespread and strong public support for speed and red light enforcement cameras.
See, e.g., D.C. Residents Agree Red Light Cameras, Speed Cameras Make Streets
Safer in Nation’s Capital, IIHS Survey Reveals, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.iihs.org/iihs/news/desktopnews/d-c-residents-agree-redlight-cameras-speed-cameras-make-streets-safer-in-nations-capital-iihs-surveyreveals [https://perma.cc/8LSC-SK8B]; Most Drivers Favor Red Light Cameras, a
New Survey of 14 Big U.S. Cities Finds, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY (June 30,
2011),
http://www.iihs.org/iihs/news/desktopnews/most-drivers-favor-red-lightcameras-a-new-survey-of-14-big-u-s-cities-finds [https://perma.cc/XGX6-EKG8].
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address those risks, more so than White and higher-income residents
who are less likely to be harmed in traffic incidents.
C.

Achieving Constitutional and Just Traffic Enforcement: Lessons
Applied

As discussed in Part III of this Article, racial disparities are
common in discretionary police traffic stops, as shown by the high
rates of African-American drivers stopped, searched, and subjected
to use of force, and are also likely to exist for traffic-injury responses
and traffic safety violations in the second enforcement stage of arrest,
adjudication, penalties, and sentencing. Some of the most tragic
outcomes, including the deaths of African-American drivers Philando
Castile, Walter Scott, and Samuel DuBose, occurred in connection
with discretionary police traffic stops. The worst possible outcomes
of such stops could be avoided through procedurally just policing.
To address racial disparities in traffic enforcement, police
departments must focus enforcement on the most dangerous safety
violations and drastically reduce pretextual discretionary stops.
Officers must undertake frequent anti-racism, subconscious bias, and
de-escalation training and education throughout their careers to help
overcome individual race-making practices.153 To further address
racial disparities and unconstitutional practices in discretionary and
pretextual traffic stops, police leadership must institutionalize the rule
that the only acceptable standard for a traffic stop is a specific and
articulable danger or violation connected to a specific driver which is
based on reasonable suspicion,154 and must require that consentbased searches become the norm, unless an officer possesses a

153. This Article discusses race-making practices in Section III.A.3. For a
discussion on the benefits of training officers, see Laura Bliss, LAPD’s Police
Reforms and the Legacy of Rodney King, CITYLAB (May 1, 2015), http://www.city
lab.com/politics/2015/05/lapds-police-reforms-and-the-legacy-of-rodney-king/392000
[https://perma.cc/689A-D8CQ]; Elizabeth Chuck, Can ‘Implicit Bias’ Training Stop
Police Officers from Acting on Hidden Prejudice?, NBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2016),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/can-implicit-bias-training-stop-policeofficers-acting-hidden-prejudice-n656071
[https://perma.cc/23WH-4D4G]
(“The
training can move the needle on implicit bias temporarily. But the research shows for
long-term impact, there needs to be ongoing engagement . . . .”); C. Munsey, Training
Helps Police Officers Overcome Racial Bias, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Sep. 2007),
http://www.apa.org/monitor/sep07/traininghelps.aspx; Marcus Wod, How Science Is
Helping America Tackle Police Racism, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2015, 6:45 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2015/01/implicit-bias-police-racism-science [https://perma.cc/
L348-CK2Q].
154. See EPP ET AL., supra note 62, at 161-62.
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warrant or has probable cause.155 Further, individuals who are
stopped should receive a card with written information about the
stop, how to obtain more information about the incident and their
rights, and how to file a complaint about their stop and search.156
Finally, automated enforcement technology should be used
extensively to limit interactions between armed police and drivers,157
and the use of body cameras by police officers should be explored.
These measures are necessary to achieve procedurally just policing,
which also results in greater compliance with traffic safety laws.158
To create agency accountability and help set a strategic plan to
overcome decades of institutional racism, cities should commission
third-party assessments on the role that race and the use of force play
in enforcement, and should establish permanent independent
community oversight of police empowered with significant
investigatory and disciplinary abilities.159 To help identify racial
disparities and measure progress to address them, police departments
must also significantly increase transparency and provide aggregate
non-personalized demographic and case outcome data online to the
public.160 All minor offenses that are not significant causal factors in
traffic injuries and fatalities, such as biking on the sidewalk, should be
decriminalized so that such offenses result only in warnings, monetary
fines, or minor civil sanctions. Finally, police departments should
help establish local restorative justice programs for drivers convicted
of dangerous driving and offenses that caused a fatality or serious
injury. Such programs have been shown to reduce recidivism and
achieve greater levels of procedural justice.161

155. See Right to Know Act, COMMUNITIES UNITED FOR POLICE REFORM,
http://changethenypd.org/RightToKnowAct
[https://perma.cc/JZ45-MARL]
(legislation to prevent discriminatory and abusive policing and improve
communication and accountability between NYPD and New Yorkers)
156. See id.
157. See discussion supra Section V.B.
158. See Meares, supra note 119, at 657.
159. See Barbara Attard, Oversight of Law Enforcement Is Beneficial and
Needed–Both Inside and Out, 30 PACE L. REV. 1548, 1557 (2010).
160. See generally OPEN DATA POLICING, https://opendatapolicing.com
[https://perma.cc/87VX-93LL].
161. For research on reduced recidivism from restorative justice practices, see PUB.
SAFETY CAN., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RECIDIVISM (2003), https://www.public
safety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/jstc-rcdvs/jstc-rcdvs-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/US2BYBX6]. For research on achieving procedural justice (with high levels of satisfaction
from program participants) through restorative justice, see Jeff Latimer & Steven
Kleinknecht, Gaps in Our Knowledge Base, in THE EFFECTS OF RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE PROGRAMMING:
A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL 17, 17 (2000),
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D. Beyond Police Traffic Enforcement As We Know It
The changes to police training, policies, and oversight, as outlined
in Section V.C, have been applied with positive effects in some
jurisdictions and are necessary steps for all cities seeking to address
racial disparities and unconstitutional practices in traffic
enforcement.162 There is strong evidence, however, that such changes
will be insufficient to address those problems.163 Some analysis
suggests that the commitments by agencies and “the most prominent
proposals for addressing racial disparities in police stops will not
work.”164 For example, a 1999 class action lawsuit, Daniels v. City of
New York, challenged the NYPD’s practice of conducting stop-andfrisks without the reasonable suspicion required by law.165 Upon
settling the case in 2003, the NYPD agreed to train all existing and
future police officers about the “legal and factual bases for
conducting and documenting stop, question, and frisk activity” and in
cultural diversity, integrity, ethics, and professionalism.166 Following
this settlement, the number of stop and frisks exploded from 97,296 in
2002, of which eighty-two percent of people stopped were not
arrested or ticketed, to a high of 685,724 in 2011, of which eighty-eight
percent were not arrested or ticketed and eighty-seven percent
involved Black or Hispanic individuals, even though those two groups
made up only fifty-two percent of the city’s population.167 In effect,
eight years after the 2003 settlement and a commitment to agencywide trainings intended to address the alleged unconstitutional stops,
the NYPD conducted more of such stops with even higher disparities.
This led to yet another class action suit, Floyd v. City of New York.168
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/rr00_16/rr00_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WP45-M3HS].
162. See generally Munsey, supra note 153 (noting that “training helped [police
officers] overcome that bias and make the correct decision, as compared to a control
group”).
163. See generally Sarina Trangle, Are Cops Biased? New NYPD Training Says
Everybody Is, CITY & STATE N.Y. (July 25, 2016), http://cityandstateny.com
/articles/politics/new-york-city/are-cops-biased-new-nypd-training-says-everybodyis.html [https://perma.cc/RX8A-VAES] (“Some social psychologists have questioned
the efficacy of implicit bias training . . . .”).
164. See EPP ET AL., supra note 62, at 160.
165. See 138 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
166. See Stipulation of Settlement at 7, Daniels, et al. v. City of New York, No. 99
Civ. 1695 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/
Daniels_StipulationOfSettlement_12_03_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y988-BS8J].
167. See Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al., CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS
[hereinafter CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS], http://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/ourcases/floyd-et-al-v-city-new-york-et-al [https://perma.cc/6VT3-NFB7].
168. See 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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A remedial order in that case by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in 2013 found that the NYPD had
violated the Fourth Amendment, by conducting unreasonable
searches, and the Fourteenth Amendment, by systematically
conducting stops and frisks in a racially discriminatory manner.169
Only in 2014, eleven years after the first settlement, did the number
of stops fall below the 2002 levels.170 Moreover, in 2015 the NYPD’s
Inspector General reported that the NYPD has “historically . . . failed
to discipline officers who use force without justification,”171 and a
federal district court described the NYPD as an agency that had
become “accustomed to disregarding” court orders.172
The history of the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices indicates that
racial disparities and unconstitutional policing practices will persist in
traffic enforcement, even after local governments commit to and
implement changes in police training, policy, and oversight. The lack
of substantial improvement indicates that the problem is institutional
and entrenched throughout police departments. As a consequence,
police departments should devote nearly all traffic enforcement
resources to crash responses and investigations, and to high-visibility
enforcement against the most dangerous and frequent traffic safety
violations. Police should also prohibit pretextual discretionary traffic
stops “except when justified by an overriding public safety
exigency,”173 and should empower unarmed traffic enforcement
agents, in place of armed police officers, to enforce most dangerous
169. See id. at 654-58. The City of New York, under then-Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit which granted the City’s motion to stay the remedial opinion and remanded
the case to District Court to be heard by a new judge. The case was, however, never
heard again, as the City, under new Mayor Bill de Blasio, decided to drop the appeal
and implement changes in accordance with the relief sought by plaintiffs. See CTR.
FOR CONST. RIGHTS, supra note 167.
170. See Stop-and-Frisk Data, NYCLU, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-friskdata [https://perma.cc/X7VY-G86K]. Even though the number of stops dropped,
racial disparities persisted at similar levels. See id.
171. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE NYPD, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF
INVESTIGATION, POLICE USE OF FORCE IN NEW YORK CITY: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON NYPD’S POLICIES AND PRACTICES 2 (2015),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/oignypd/assets/downloads/pdf/oig_nypd_use_of_force_repor
t_-_oct_1_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ4H-9TUF].
172. See Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Judge Rejects Settlement over
Surveillance of Muslims by New York Police Department , N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/nyregion/nypd-muslim-lawsuitsettlement.html [https://perma.cc/TRX5-ZGX5] (discussing a court order
disapproving of a proposed settlement in Handschu v. Special Services Division, No.
71 Civ. 02203 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2016)).
173. EPP ET AL., supra note 62, at 161.
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driving offenses. Finally, local governments should apply widespread
automated enforcement technology, operated and controlled by nonpolice agencies, to target dangerous driving offenses.
CONCLUSION
Vision Zero can only be achieved if cities fully embrace the two
new E’s: equity and evaluation. Engineering, education, and
enforcement must be guided by data-driven, intersectional, and
inclusionary analyses that consider age, gender, geography, and socioeconomic condition, as well as race and historical inequities in each
area. Cities must target the most dangerous common driving offenses
by making enforcement highly visible, uniform, widespread, and
sustained, vastly expanding automated enforcement, and eliminating
nearly all discretionary police stops. This will help achieve the
greatest public deterrence against dangerous driving and avoid the
worst outcomes of racially biased, unconstitutional, and illegitimate
policing. Not only is just policing a moral obligation, it is a requisite
tool for optimal deterrence, efficient use of public resources, and
fostering vital public trust and engagement. Without fully addressing
racial biases and disparities in traffic enforcement, we will never be
able to reach Vision Zero.

